amsterdam.hostmaster.org/12
And for our friends "down under": Just substitute North for South. https://x.com/R34lB0rg/status/1907147650417217631
Lost your GPS? Let the sky be your guide:
Sun rises in the east, approaches south mid-day and sets in the west.
Full Moon mirrors the arc of the sun, a waxing crescent (in the evening) points west, a waning crescent (in the morning) points east.
Since the beginning of Ramadan, the Israeli occupation has imposed a suffocating blockade on Gaza, forcing 18 bakeries to completely shut down due to a shortage of flour and the lack of essential bread-making ingredients. With skyrocketing prices and a shortage of cooking gas, Gazans are struggling to make ends meet. If this forced starvation continues, thousands of lives will be at risk of starvation. Is there anyone to respond?
Urgent | Dear colleague and journalist Mohammed Saleh al-Bardawil, his wife and children were martyred as a result of an Israeli airstrike on his apartment in Khan Yunis, south of the Gaza Strip. https://x.com/AnasAlSharif0/status/1906859417045172620
A tribute to @HossamShabat (عَلَيْهِ ٱلسَّلَامُ): You can silence the messenger but the truth will continue to echo. https://x.com/R34lB0rg/status/1906983864901243371/photo/1
If you conflate Zionism with Judaism, you're supporting Israel and their actions in Gaza. #Hasbara hinges on framing critique as antisemitism to shield policy. Target the state, not the faith. https://x.com/R34lB0rg/status/1906952107543970101
FYI @EFF @ACLU @CenDemTech @amnesty @citizenlab @accessnow @privacyint @RSF_inter https://x.com/R34lB0rg/status/1906941232384749755
The Clipper chip was a bold misstep by the U.S. government’s three-letter agencies—NSA, FBI, CIA—in the 1990s. Designed as an encryption chipset for telephones, it promised security with a catch: a backdoor via key escrow, letting law enforcement decrypt calls with the right paperwork. Launched in 1993, it crashed and burned by 1996—privacy advocates revolted, a flaw exposed by Matt Blaze shredded its credibility, and the market rejected it. AT&T’s TSD-3600, the only Clipper-equipped phone, sold a paltry 9,000 units before fading away. The takeaway for the agencies? Forcing backdoors down the public’s throat doesn’t work when the agenda’s out in the open.
Today, they’ve pivoted to a subtler play: government purchasing power. No need for mandates when billions in contracts—military, federal, agency tech—can nudge manufacturers into compliance. Android’s ecosystem fits this bill perfectly. OEMs like Samsung, Xiaomi, and even Google don’t need a law to embed “special access” features if a lucrative deal hints at it. Locked bootloaders, proprietary firmware, and telemetry aren’t just for user safety—they’re control points, shaped by market incentives rather than public edicts. Clipper’s failure taught them stealth trumps swagger; now they wield influence through dollars, not decrees.
Why should manufacturers care what you do with their devices? They shouldn’t. Their job is to sell phones, not dictate your usage. Yet Android’s ecosystem is a fortress of restrictions—rooting is a war against Knox, SafetyNet, or carrier locks. If they’ve got no ulterior motive, why fight your freedom? The answer lies in who they’re really serving. Banks and government apps tout Android as secure—Play Protect, sandboxing—while pre-installed bloatware phones home and OEMs get caught with backdoors (think OnePlus logging clipboard data or HTC’s Carrier IQ mess). It’s security theater, not sovereignty. Control benefits someone—advertisers, governments, or both—not the owner holding the device.
Israel’s exploitation of Android shows how this plays out. Reports from 2024, like The Intercept’s dive into WhatsApp vulnerabilities, reveal how metadata—who’s talking, when, where—pinpoints targets in Gaza. The “Lavender” system, per +972 Magazine, rates Palestinians for strikes based on digital trails, including WhatsApp usage. NSO Group’s Pegasus spyware, sold globally, takes it further—zero-click exploits via WhatsApp messages turn Android phones into tracking beacons or live mics. Amnesty International’s 2019 Moroccan activist findings and Citizen Lab’s 2021 journalist report highlight its reach. No Clipper-style backdoor needed—just an ecosystem ripe for abuse.
Silent SMS adds another layer. These invisible “Type 0” messages ping your Android without a peep—Germany’s police sent tens of thousands yearly (Der Spiegel, 2010), and Israel’s linked to similar tricks via NSO tools. Built into the GSM standard, they’re sold as network tools—testing signals, aiding 911 calls. But in 2025, with LTE/5G, why’s this silent backchannel still there? The legit use case is thin; the surveillance payoff is fat. A phone that answers unseen pings is a locator for anyone with carrier access or the right exploit. It’s not for you—it’s for them.
From Clipper to Android, the shift is clear. Agencies learned overt backdoors flop—now they lean on purchasing clout to shape ecosystems like Android’s. Manufacturers shouldn’t care what you do, but they do—because their loyalty isn’t to you. Israel’s tracking, WhatsApp’s holes, and silent SMS prove the tools are embedded, ready for use. Android’s not your device; it’s theirs.
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Beim Eiffelturm sitzen die größten Nieten unten!